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The paper studies a ﬁscal policy instrument that can reduce ﬁscal distortions without aﬀecting
revenues, in a politically viable way. The instrument is a private contract (tax buyout), oﬀered by
the government to each citizen, whereby the citizen can choose to pay a ﬁxed price in exchange for
a given reduction in her tax rate for a period of time. We introduce the tax buyout in a dynamic
overlapping generations economy, calibrated to match several features of the US income, taxes and
wealth distribution. Under simple pricing, the introduction of the buyout is revenue neutral but, by
reducing distortions,it beneﬁts a signiﬁcant fraction of the population and leads to sizable increases
in aggregate labor supply, income and consumption.
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One of the main legacies of the 2007-8 economic crisis is the huge increase in governments’
liabilities, following the expansionary policies enacted to bail out the ﬁnancial sector and
to stimulate economic activity. According to the March 2010 estimates of the CBO, the US
federal government will record deﬁcits of 10.3 percent of GDP in 2010 and 8.9 percent in
2011. Against the backdrop of increasing social security and medical assistance liabilities,
the pressure to restore ﬁscal sustainability is already building up: ﬁscal pressure is bound to
increase soon in the US and in many other developed countries. In these circumstances it is
fundamental to reconsider the debate on the detrimental role of high taxation on economic
activity (see for example Prescott 2004, Mankiw and Weinzierl, 2006). Increased tax rates
might not be very eﬀective in improving the ﬁscal stance if they substantially depress the
level of activity.
This paper evaluates an instrument for ﬁscal policy that is designed to reduce distortions
without reducing revenues. The instrument is a private contract between the government
and private citizens whereby each agent has the option to pay the government a ﬁxed price
in exchange for a given reduction in her marginal tax rate. We refer to this contract as a
“tax buyout”: the contract makes it possible for the agent to eﬀectively buy out a portion of
her distortionary taxes via a lump-sum payment. Participation is entirely voluntary: those
individuals that have most to gain from a reduction in the marginal tax rate self-select into
the program.
In the ﬁrst part of the paper we review the working of the tax buyout in a simple
model economy with asymmetric information where the price of the contract cannot be
made contingent on agents’ abilities since the government has only partial information (if
any) about these abilities. We show the existence of a simple linear pricing scheme of the
tax buyout which is Pareto-improving (abstracting from general equilibrium eﬀects) and
at the same time revenue neutral. The intuition for this result is that the ineﬃciencies
generated by distortionary taxation, once removed, create a surplus that the government
can share with the agents. Therefore the government can price the contract high enough to
make positive revenues, yet low enough to attract agents with high ability and high income
prospects. We then discuss the implications of oﬀering a menu of contracts such that high
ability agents self-select into high tax reduction-high price contracts and discuss the relation
between the tax buyout and optimal non linear tax schedules.
Since theory suggests tax buyouts are a simple and eﬀective way to reduce distortions,
1in the second part of the paper we ask our main question, i.e., what are the eﬀects of making
these contracts available to US residents in a time of high ﬁscal pressure?
To answer the question we introduce tax buyouts in a dynamic overlapping generation
model with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets as those used by Conesa, Kitao
and Krueger (2008) or Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2008) for policy analysis.
We calibrate the model parameters to match existing micro-studies and several features of
the US income and wealth distribution derived from the Current Population Survey and
the Survey of Consumer Finance. We start from a steady-state equilibrium with a ﬁxed
government spending ﬁnanced through a progressive tax income schedule which resembles
the one observed in the US. We then consider an exogenous increase in government spending
(capturing the current ﬁscal situation) of the order of 20% under two alternative scenarios:
with and without a tax buyout scheme. The baseline buyout we consider is a reduction
in the marginal tax rate of at most 5% oﬀered at a price of roughly $4500, which ensures
revenue neutrality.
We ﬁnd that the buyout in each period is purchased by a little less than 10% of the
population, nevertheless its eﬀects are macroeconomically relevant as its introduction raises
GDP by almost 1%, reducing by approximately by one third the negative consequences of
the overall tax increase on the level of economic activity. This is because buyers are generally
high ability agents, who contribute most to GDP. We also ﬁnd that these numbers are fairly
stable with respect to comparative statics exercises on a series of key parameters, such as
the elasticity of labor supply or the amount of the tax buyout oﬀered. Finally, we show
that, in our dynamic setting, even households not buying the contract in the current period
might beneﬁt from its introduction in terms of lifetime welfare. For example, since wages
increase with age, a young household might not buy the contract today but do so at a
future date, when her wage has increased suﬃciently. This indicates that the long run
beneﬁt of introducing this instrument spreads over a larger share of the population than
current buyers.
The idea of the tax buyout is very much related to the idea of oﬀering taxpayers alter-
native tax schedules and letting them choose among them. Alesina and Weil (1992) and
Slemrod et al. (1994) propose such schemes in a static setting. Relative to their work our
contribution lies in the quantitative evaluation of the buyout in a dynamic economy that
captures several macro moments and key dimensions of heterogeneity of the current US
economy. Also we study in more details the issue of non linear pricing and the relation of
these schemes with the non linear optimal taxation literature (Mirrlees, 1971). In particular
2the contract generates tax schedules that, under some conditions, are reminiscent of those
proposed by that literature as it delivers lower marginal rates for high ability individuals.
Diﬀerently from those mechanisms, from the agents’ perspective the exchange is not the
result of a unilateral determination on the part of the government, but of free choice. This
ensures that the allocation achieved with the contract is a Pareto improvement with respect
to that without it, making it a politically viable mechanism of reduction of the distortionary
eﬀects of taxation. However, more recent contributions have proposed various instances in
which a concave tax schedule might not be optimal. For example, Diamond (1998) and Saez
(2001) show that the shape of the optimal tax function depends, among other things, on
the distribution of ability in the population. In particular, fat-tail unbounded distributions
such as the Pareto can make increasing marginal rates socially desirable. Also, under these
conditions a price of the contract that guarantees revenue neutrality may not exist. In these
cases, the tax buyout would not be a useful policy tool.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review some general
results on the tax buyout scheme in a simple static economy. Section 3 introduces the OLG
model and discusses the calibration and section 4 uses the model to evaluate the eﬀects of
introducing the buyout contract following an large increase in government spending. In the
conclusions we discuss additional issues to tackle on the way to making the buyout scheme
a concrete policy option, a goal especially important in a period of unprecedented ﬁscal
deﬁcits.
2 A simple model with heterogeneous productivity
In this section we consider a small open economy populated by a continuum of agents.
Agents’ productivity A is constant over time and distributed according to the CDF FA(A).
Agents are endowed with initial amount of wealth ˜ w. The government uses labor taxes to
ﬁnance a constant ﬂow of government spending g. We consider the simple case where the
tax rate is constant and equal to τ. Private agents and the government have access to the
world capital market where they can borrow and lend at the risk-free rate r. We assume
that this exogenous risk-free rate equals the inverse of the discount rate: β(1 + r) = 1.
Our modiﬁcation to this otherwise standard set-up is that in each period the government
oﬀers each agent a contract, whereby the agent agrees to pay an amount of resources upfront
in exchange for a reduction in her tax rate. If the agent does not buy the contract, she faces
the pre-contract tax rate τ: status quo is always an option. Under perfect information the
3contract is designed in such a way that the value of resources extracted from each agent
remains the same as in the pre-contract regime, regardless of the amount of tax reduction the
agent chooses to purchase. That is, the contract is revenue neutral from the government’s
perspective, agent by agent. We show that under these conditions agents will want to pay
all their taxes upfront in lump-sum form. The logic of this result is straightforward: The
contract gives agents the opportunity to turn distortionary taxation into lump-sum taxation,
and revenue neutrality implies that all the beneﬁts from the reduction in distortions accrue
to the agent. The economy with perfect information is a useful starting point for our
analysis, as it highlights the basic insights of the contract, that will hold also in a more
realistic setting. However, under perfect information, a benevolent government could more
simply use lump-sum taxation – where the lump-sum taxes are a function of the ﬁxed
component of ability A – in the ﬁrst place.
We then turn to study an economy with asymmetric information, where the government
knows the ability distribution but does not observe individual ability. The question is
whether the introduction of the contract can be Pareto-improving in spite of this constraint.
We show that this is the case. The intuition for this result is that the ineﬃciencies generated
by distortionary taxation, once removed, create a surplus that the government can share
with the agents. Therefore the government can price the contract high enough to make
positive revenues, yet low enough to be attractive to the high ability agents.
2.1 The economy





yt = Alt, (2)
respectively, where ct and lt are consumption and labor in period t, yt is labor income,
β > 0 is the time discount factor and u is a standard utility function. To simplify notation,
deﬁne w = r ˜ w as the ﬂow value of wealth. In addition, the assumption β(1+r) = 1 implies





w + (1 − τ)Al(A,w,τ) − c(A,w,τ) = 0 (4)
where c(A,w,τ) > 0, l(A,w,τ) ∈ [0,1], and the initial wealth level is given. For simplicity,
we abstract from diﬀerences in wealth. All arguments go through when explicitly condition-





Stationary equilibria for this economy are characterized by policy functions c(A,w,τ)
and l(A,w,τ), and a Lagrange multiplier λ(A,w,τ) associated with (4) satisfying:
uc(c(A,w,τ),l(A,w,τ)) = λ(A,w,τ) (6)
A(1 − τ)uc(c(A,w,τ),l(A,w,τ)) = − ul(c(A,w,τ),l(A,w,τ)) (7)
as well as the budget constraint (4), and a tax rate τ satisfying (5).
2.2 The economy with the contract: perfect information
At the beginning of each period each agent is oﬀered a menu of contracts {δ,D} from which
she can buy a reduction δ in its tax rate for the current ﬁscal year in exchange for the
payment of a premium D. Under perfect information the ability level A is known to both
the government and the agent. We assume the government chooses D such that the contract
is revenue neutral for each agent. Therefore D is a function of both A and δ (as well as w,
non stated explicitly to simplify notation) that satisﬁes:
D(A,δ) = τAl(A,w,τ) − (τ − δ)Al(A,w − D,τ − δ) (8)
where l(A,w − D,τ − δ) is the policy function for labor under the new regime. Note that
the government is exploiting its knowledge of the agents’ policy function in designing the
contract.
In expression (8) we have used the same policy function for labor supply described in
the previous section, with the only diﬀerence that the arguments w and τ are replaced by
w−D and τ −δ, respectively. Indeed, one can see that for any given δ these policy functions
5satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions as well as the new budget constraint:
(w − D) + (1 − τ + δ)Al(A,w − D,τ − δ) − c(A,w − D,τ − δ) = 0. (9)
Moreover, since the contract is such that the government’s intertemporal budget constraint





((τ − δ)Al(A,w − D,τ − δ) + D(A,δ)) dFA(A)
(10)
In the remainder of the paper we will use a short-hand notation lA(δ,D) = l(A,w−D;τ−δ),
cA(δ,D) = c(A,w−D;τ −δ), and λA(δ,D) = λ(A,w−D,τ −δ) to denote aggregate (ability
adjusted) labor supply, consumption, and Lagrange multiplier, respectively, for a (A,w)-
cohort. Thus, lA(0,0) is labor supply without the contract. Next we turn to the question
of the optimal choice of δ, the amount of tax reduction:
Proposition 1 If the government prices the contract according to (8), agents will choose
to buy the maximum possible tax reduction. Moreover, labor supply will increase for each
agent.
Proof: see the Appendix
The proof uses the fact that the contract can be represented by the combination of a
compensated price change and a rightward shift of the budget constrain (deﬁned in terms
of consumption and leisure). As a consequence, the pre-contract optimal allocation remains
feasible after the purchase of the contract. Hence, purchasing the contract cannot but raise
the agent’s utility. Moreover, at the new prices the lower tax wedge implies that agents will
choose to work more.
2.3 The economy with the contract: asymmetric information
This section studies the economy with asymmetric information. We assume that the gov-
ernment has no information whatsoever on A, and hence needs to oﬀer everyone the same
price for the contract D(δ). We want to show that the contract can be Pareto improving
even under asymmetric information. Namely, we want to show that there exists a function
D(δ) such that: (i) a positive mass of agents takes the contract, and (ii) the government
budget is still balanced. The second condition implies that those agents who do not take
6the contract are made no worse oﬀ by its introduction. We will prove (i) and (ii) for a linear
pricing function of the form D(δ) = dδ. Of course, more general pricing functions will allow
the government to improve on the outcome obtained with the linear pricing function. We
will explore this aspect numerically later.
First, we discuss two results on the optimal choice of δ for linear pricing functions.
Lemma 1 Under a linear pricing function D(δ) = dδ, an agent of ability A will either not
buy into the contract or buy the maximum amount allowed.
Proof: see the Appendix
According to Lemma 1, linear pricing functions are completely characterized by the
maximum allowed tax reduction and the per-unit price of such reduction, {¯ δ,d}. For each
level of ability we deﬁne two (per-δ-unit) prices, dA and dA. The former is the lowest
price at which the government is not losing resources from oﬀering the contract to agent A.
The latter is the price for which agent A is indiﬀerent between taking and not taking the
contract.
Lemma 2 Under a linear pricing function D(δ) = dδ, for each level of ability A there
exist:
i) A per-unit price dA such that agent A is willing to enter the contract and the govern-
ment is neither losing nor gaining resources from the agent.
ii) A per-unit price dA for which agent A is indiﬀerent between taking and not taking the
contract. If agent A decides to enter the contract, the government is gaining resources
from the agent.
Proof: see the Appendix
A consequence of Lemma 2 is:
Corollary 1 For d ∈ (dA,dA) the government is gaining resources from oﬀering the con-
tract to agent A, and agent A is willing to take the contract.
7We have just shown that for each level of ability there is a price that is high enough
to make government’s revenues positive, yet low enough to be attractive to the agents.
The removal of the ineﬃciency due to distortionary taxation creates a surplus that the
government and the agent can share.
Building on this result, we now show that the government can attract into the contract
the upper tail of the ability distribution, and still make positive revenues. Once we have
shown this, it follows that the contract is Pareto-improving: the government could either
rebate these excess revenues to all agents, or lower the price even further to attract more
agents into the contract. Here we pursue the latter route, and show that if the price is low
enough the government’s excess revenues are driven to zero.
Lemma 3 Assume the single-crossing condition (Salani´ e 2003) holds. If agent with ability
A(d) is indiﬀerent between buying and not buying the contract under price d¯ δ, all agents
with ability A > A(d) will choose to purchase the contract.
Proof: see the Appendix
Deﬁne the marginal ability A(d) as the level of ability for which dA = d. This function
is implicitly deﬁned by the equation
u(cA(¯ δ,d¯ δ),lA(¯ δ,d¯ δ)) = u(cA(0,0),lA(0,0))
Such level is well deﬁned for any d ≤ dA, where A is the upper bounds of the support of
the ability distribution. The standard regularity conditions on the utility functions imply
that the mapping A(d) is continuous. As a consequence of Lemma 3 agents with ability
less than A(d) will not take the contract, while agents with ability greater than A(d) will.





(τ − ¯ δ)AlA(¯ δ,d¯ δ) − τAlA(0,0)
i
dFA(A) + d¯ δ(1 − FA(A(d))) (11)
It is easy to show that continuity of A(d) implies that R(d) is continuous for d < dA.
From Lemma 2 we have that the government can attract to the contract the upper tail
of the ability distribution, and still extract excess revenues from all of these high ability
agents if d > dA:
8Corollary 2 For d ∈ [dA,dA) all agents with ability A ∈ [A(d),A] will take the contract,
where A(d) is strictly less than A. Moreover, R(d) > 0 in this interval.
Our ﬁnal assumption is that, when the contract is priced at zero, the government is
losing money R(0) < 0. This is simply assuming that we are not on the declining portion
of the Laﬀer curve, where a tax decrease leads to an increase in revenue, in which case the
government should simply lower taxes. The above corollary, the continuity of R(d), and the
above assumption imply the key result of this section:
Proposition 2 There exist a pricing function D(δ) = d∗δ, with d∗ ∈ (0,dA), such that:
(i) a positive mass of agents with A ∈ [A(d∗),A] enter the contract; (ii) the government’s
budget is balanced: R(d∗) = 0.
Since those who enter the contract are better oﬀ, and those who do not enter the contract
are no worse oﬀ given that the government still balances the budget, we have shown that
the contract is Pareto improving. Figure 1 below gives an illustration of the proposition, as
it plots the government losses as a function of d, the price of the contract.1 Starting from
the right the ﬁgure shows that as the price d is large losses are close to 0, as only few reach
agents elect to purchase the buyout. As the price falls more households participate and
initially the revenues from higher participation oﬀset the losses from lower prices, so that
government revenues increase (losses fall). As the price is lowered further though the price
eﬀect dominates the increased participation, and losses increase. When the price reaches d∗
losses are 0, so the government does not lose from introducing the contract and a positive
fraction of the population takes it.
An important caveat needs to be mentioned. We have assumed an upper bound to the
ability distribution, and this assumption is quite important in obtaining our result. However,
a fat right tail of the ability distribution may imply that the government makes very large
revenue losses on high ability individuals when implementing the contract, jeopardizing
revenue neutrality. In fact, one can easily show that with a Pareto distribution, under
quasi-linear utility, for some parameter values revenue neutrality is never achieved.
2.4 Non linear pricing
The theory of static Pareto eﬃcient taxation (Mirrlees 1971, Stiglitz 1982) argues the opti-
mal tax schedule entails diﬀerent marginal tax rates for individuals with diﬀerent abilities
1The ﬁgure is drawn for a log-normal distribution of abilities.
9Figure 1: Government losses and the price of the buyout












Price of the contract, d
so to achieve self-selection. We have excluded this possibility so far. Starting from propor-
tional taxes and a continuum of abilities – the case considered in the previous section – the
post-contract equilibrium entails two diﬀerent marginal tax rates for the entire population,
which is obviously far from the continuum suggested by the optimal taxation literature.
This feature of the contract can be relaxed. Although, for computational feasibility, in the
quantitative assessment of the buyout we will stick to linear schemes, in this section we
investigate the eﬀects of allowing for non-linear pricing schemes in the simple model.
We consider a discretized version of our economy, where ability takes up N values
Ai, i = 1,2,...,N, with Ai < Ai+1. We call an agent with ability Ai agent i. The
government oﬀers N contracts {δi,Di}N
i=1. We call this discretization “many contracts”
as opposed to the “one contract” of the previous section. In the appendix we describe
an algorithm for computing the set of N contracts that delivers self-selection, where by
self-selection we mean that the pricing scheme is such that any two agents Ai and Aj will
choose diﬀerent contracts, {δi,Di} and {δj,Dj} respectively, in case they decide to buy
the reduction in the marginal tax rate. This self-selection implies that, consistently with
the optimal taxation literature, agents with diﬀerent abilities will face diﬀerent marginal
10tax rates. The idea of the algorithm is the following. From optimal taxation literature
we know that the highest ability individual AN should have the lowest marginal tax rate.
The government then chooses the couple {δN,DN} with δN ﬁxed at the highest allowed
amount. The price of the contract DN is chosen so that the entire scheme {δi,Di} is
revenue neutral. Then, a second contract {δN−1,DN−1} is determined such that agent N is
indiﬀerent between contract {δN,DN} and {δN−1,DN−1} while agent N −1 strictly prefers
the latter. This procedure is iterated for all i until we get to the agent who is indiﬀerent
between buying and not buying the marginal rate reduction. Although the algorithm uses
only pairwise comparisons of contracts, in the appendix we show that it ensures that agent
i chooses contract i over any other contract.
Once computed the {δi,Di}N
i=1 schedule that achieves self-selection, we can use it to
analyze its properties numerically. The appendix provides details on the calibration of the
economy used to obtain the results below. Figure 2 compares the “many contracts” to the
“one contract” with ¯ δ = .13. The value of ¯ δ in the linear case and the {δi,Di}N
i=1 schedule in
the non-linear case are chosen so that the fraction of agents entering the tax buyout scheme
is approximately the same. In all panels the horizontal axis displays the pre-contract income
(AlA(0,0)), which is a monotone function of ability. Panel (a) displays the chosen δ as a
function of income. The lines stop at the ability level (expressed in terms of pre-contract
income) below which agents prefer not to purchase the contract. As shown in the previous
section, in the linear case all agents buying the contract choose the maximum level of δ. In
the non-linear case δi increases in the pre-contract income. In the example considered here
the increase is approximately linear.
Panel (b) displays the associated price of the contract D(δ) as a function of income. In
the linear case all agents buying the contract pay the same price. In the non-linear case, the
price D(δ) is a convex function of δ, which is what we would expect from the household’s
maximization problem with respect to δ. In fact the ﬁrst order conditions of the agent with










The fact that the ﬁrst term within parentheses increases in A implies that ∂D
∂δ also increases
in the level of ability.
Panel (c) shows the cumulated government losses from the oﬀering contract, starting
from the highest ability individuals (hence, we accumulate losses going from right to left).
11Figure 2: One versus Many Contracts
(a) (b)

























































































































































12By construction, in both cases the total government losses from the contract are approxi-
mately zero (i.e, both lines reach zero for the indiﬀerent agent). The shape of the cumulated
government losses is very similar for the linear and the non-linear pricing schemes in this
speciﬁcation. In both cases the government loses revenues on high ability individuals: In
the linear pricing scheme δ is lower than in the non-linear pricing scheme, but so is the
price. In both cases, consistently with the theory, the government makes positive revenues
on the agents that are close to being indiﬀerent.
Panel (d) shows utility relative to pre-contract. The ﬁgure shows that the non-linear
scheme is a Pareto improvement over the linear one: for all agents utility increases. For
the close-to-indiﬀerent agents, not surprisingly, utility is very close under the two schemes,
but as the level of ability increases, the non-linear scheme delivers progressively higher
utility. As ﬁgure (c) makes clear, the “many contracts” environment allows the government
to deliver higher utility to high ability individuals without having much greater losses. Of
course, the lower distortions for high ability individuals under “many contracts” result in
higher labor supply and output than in the “one contract” case.
We have also compared the same “one contract” scheme (¯ δ = .13) to a “many contracts”
environment where the top ability individual is oﬀered a contract with a tax reduction of
at most .13 (δN = .13). Unlike in the previous example, this set of contracts makes high
ability individuals worse oﬀ than under the one contract scheme, since the highest ability
individual is now paying for the same tax reduction a higher price than under the linear
scheme. As a consequence, if for high levels of ability the government is losing money under
the “one contract” scheme, the government is losing less money under “many contracts.”
The extra resources make it aﬀordable to both charge a lower price to individuals that
before were close to being indiﬀerent, and extend the contract to less able people. Both
sets of people are better oﬀ under the “many contracts” scheme. In our example it also
turns out that aggregate output is larger under many contracts, even though higher ability
individuals are subject to more distortions.
2.5 The contract and the informationally constrained Pareto frontier
In this section we brieﬂy discuss the conditions under which the contract can take the
economy to the informationally-constrained Pareto-eﬃcient frontier, that is, can replicate
the outcome of Mirrlees’ optimal taxation. In order to discuss issues of optimal taxation
we need to consider more general forms of taxation T(yA), where yA = AlA, than the
13proportional taxation analyzed so far. Equilibrium in this economy is characterized by
policy functions cA, lA, and δA satisfying
cA = AlA − T(AlA) + δAAlA + (w − D(δA)), (13)
−∂u(c,l)/∂l
∂u(c,l)/∂c
= A(1 − T0(AlA) + δA), (14)
as well as the ﬁrst order condition with respect to δ (12), which is unchanged. Call ˜ T(.)
the solution of the constrained social planner’s problem and ˜ cA and ˜ lA (and ˜ yA = A˜ lA)
the corresponding equilibrium allocations, which satisfy (13) and (14) with δ = D(δ) = 0.
We want to investigate under which conditions the contract can deliver the Pareto-optimal
allocation starting from an arbitrary initial tax schedule T(y).
From (14) the amount of tax reduction δA an agent of ability A needs to buy is:
˜ δA = T0(˜ yA) − ˜ T0(˜ yA). (15)
The tax reduction δA is positive only if the marginal tax rate at the optimum is lower than
the current one. Hence a ﬁrst, quite intuitive, constraint on what the contract can achieve
is that the slope of optimal tax schedule needs to be no higher than the existing one. In
other words, the contract can only be used to induce a reduction in marginal tax rates, and
not an increase. In addition, participation in the buy-out scheme is voluntary: agents must
be made better oﬀ by purchasing the contract. This induces additional constraints relative
to the informationally constrained planner.
We can reverse-engineer which pricing function D(δ) may work from the ﬁrst order
condition with respect to δ (12). This condition states that the pricing function that
induces an agent of ability A to buy precisely the quantity δA of tax reduction needs to
satisfy the necessary condition:
D0(˜ δA) = A˜ lA = ˜ yA. (16)









Condition (17) says that the extent to which we can implement the optimal allocation
with the contract depends on where we want to get to (which point on the Pareto-eﬃcient
14frontier) relative to where we are (current tax system). Speciﬁcally, the condition tells us
that D(δA) needs to be suﬃciently convex and this is the case only if ˜ T00(˜ yA) < T00(˜ yA) −
1/A∂lA
∂δ , that is, only if the optimal marginal tax schedule is decreasing more rapidly with
income than the current one. If the current tax system is proportional, the condition
translates to ˜ T00(˜ yA) < −1/A∂lA
∂δ , i.e., the contract can only get to points on the frontier
where the marginal tax rate decreases with income. Indeed, the literature has shown that the
optimal tax schedule is not necessarily concave (Diamond, 1998; Saez, 2001). In particular,
fat-tailed, unbounded distributions for ability can require convex tax schedules, in which
case the contract cannot take the economy on the frontier. Moreover, the larger the gap
T00(˜ y) − ˜ T00(˜ y) – the reduction in marginal tax rates as a function of income – the harder
it is to implement it with the contract. Intuitively, to get a large reduction in marginal tax
rates as a function of income one needs δ to increase substantially as income grows. That
implies that D(δ) cannot be too convex. But if D(δ) is not too convex, the second order
conditions may be violated.
3 Quantitative analysis
In this section we present a calibrated model economy which will allow us to evaluate more
precisely the eﬀects of making a tax buyout contract available to US households. Our
setting is similar to the one used in recent works that use calibrated life-cycle heterogenous
agents economies in order to analyze policy issues (see for example Conesa et al., 2008 or
Heathcote et al., 2008 and 2010, Fukushima, 2010). We consider a discrete time small open
economy inhabited by overlapping generations of ﬁnitely lived households. Production is
carried out by a representative ﬁrm which uses a constant return to scale technology to
produce a single good, used for consumption and investment. A government levies taxes,
provides transfers and public spending and might oﬀer tax buyouts. We now describe in
more detail households, ﬁrms and government, deﬁne equilibrium, describe the calibration
procedure and ﬁnally perform the experiment of introducing a tax buyout.
153.1 Households
Each period a new generation of mass 1/(N +1) of unitary households is born. Preferences







where ch and lh are consumption and labor eﬀort of the household at age h, u is a standard
utility function, β > 0 is the time discount factor (possibly household speciﬁc) and VN+1
represents the value of retirement (to be speciﬁed later).2 Each household is born with a
wealth endowment a0 and is endowed with 1 unit of time in each period of its life. For the
ﬁrst N years of life households can work in the market and each unit of time spent working
yields eh eﬃciency units of work, where eh is given by
eh = eAzhεhph
where A is a individual speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, zh is a deterministic age eﬀect, εh is a idiosyn-
cratic transitory shock and ph is a idiosyncratic persistent shock. All these 4 states are
exogenous, in the sense that they do not depend on any household decision. For simplicity
we will denote with the letter S = (A,zh,εh,ph) these exogenous states and by S the set of
all possible values taken by S.
3.1.1 Retirement
During retirement households are not allowed to work. The only role played by retirement
in our setup is to aﬀect the wealth accumulation motive during working life. We capture
this eﬀect in this simple fashion
VN+1 = VN+1(a,S) ≡
u(φa + TR(S),0)
(1 − β) + βφ
(18)
where φa represents the annuity value of wealth and TR(S) represents the annuity value of
all social security payments for an agent entering retirement with state S. The key param-
eter here is
β−1
β < φ ≤ 1 which captures in a reduced form way the length of retirement. A
small φ implies a small annuity value (the eﬀect of φ in the numerator in equation (18)) but
2To keep notation light in this section we omit t subscripts (indicating diﬀerent calendar dates) and i
subscripts (indicating diﬀerent households).
16a large total utility (the eﬀect of φ in the denominator in equation (18)), thus capturing the
idea of a long retirement period, which induces agents to accumulate more wealth. Similarly
a large φ captures the idea of short retirement period, as the limit, with φ = 1, retirement
lasts exactly one period. In our exercise φ is treated as a parameter and is set to match
age-wealth accumulation proﬁles from the SCF data.
3.1.2 Working age
In each period households decide how much to work, consume, accumulate wealth in a
risk free uncontingent bond and how much tax reduction to buy. Agents are allowed to
purchase a tax buyout contract every period, and the purchase aﬀects only tax rates in
that period. The contract in its most general form is represented by a set ∆ of possible tax
rate reductions and by a pricing function D(δh,Sh) which maps quantity of tax reduction
purchased δh and household states into prices. We restrict our attention to pricing functions
that are (possibly) dependent only on variables that can be contracted upon, such as age
and past level of income. The problem of an agent of age h with wealth ah and state Sh
can be written in a recursive fashion as
Vh(ah,Sh) = max
δh,ah+1,lh
u(ch,lh) + βEVh+1(ah+1,Sh+1),h = 1,N
s.t.
ch + D(δh,Sh) + ah+1 + T(ωeh(Sh)lh,rah,δh) = (1 + r)ah + ωeh(Sh)lh
δ ∈ ∆,a0 ≥ 0
where ω is the wage rate per eﬃciency unit and where, for simplicity, we assume wealth is
restricted to be non negative. The function T(ωeh(S)lh,rah,δh) represents the total taxes
paid by an agent with labor income ωeh(S)lh, capital income rah and tax buyout purchase
δh. Let the function ¯ T(ωeh(S)lh,rah) be the current tax code (without the buyout). Then
the function T(ωeh(S)lh,rah,δ) = max(¯ T(ωehlh,rah) − ωlδ,0). This implies, in practical
terms, that when an agent who has purchased δ units of the buyout ﬁles taxes, she simply
computes the tax bill under the standard tax code and then subtracts from the tax bill a
fraction δ of labor earnings. The solution to this problem can be represented by age de-
pendent decision rules for labor eﬀort lh(ah,Sh), consumption ch(ah,Sh), next period assets
ah+1(ah,Sh) and tax buyouts δh(ah,Sh). An important consequence of this speciﬁcation is
that although agents face idiosyncratic uncertainty, the decision of whether or not to take
17the contract is a period by period one, and it is taken after agents have observed all shocks,
so purchasing the buyout does not involve risk; again in practical terms we suggest that
agents may make the buyout decision at the time of tax ﬁling. What is crucial for the
eﬀectiveness of the contract is for agents to be aware of the option at the time they decide
labor supply, as the presence of the contract will, in general, aﬀect returns from working.
3.2 Firm
Output is produced by a representative, competitive and proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm which hires
labor L at price ω and capital K at price r and uses a standard constant returns to scale
technology so that its proﬁts are given by
KαL1−α − (κ + r)K − ωL
where 0 < α < 1 is the share of capital in the technology and κ is the rate of depreciation
of capital used in production.
3.3 Government
In each period the government has to ﬁnance a constant ﬂow of unproductive government
consumption g, transfers to retired household and interest on debt rb; its receipts are given
by taxes, sales of tax buyouts and issue of new debt b0. Let Fh(a,S) be a distribution of
households of age h over assets a and exogenous states S, then the budget constraint can
be written as














A steady state equilibrium is the following set of objects:
• Decision rules of households: lh(a,S),ah+1(a,S) δh(a,S) and of ﬁrms for K(r,ω) and
L(r,ω)
18• Prices ω,r
• Government policies: T(ωe(S)l,ra,δ),TR(S),∆,D(δ,S),g,b
• Distribution of agents over states Fh(a,S),h = 1,...,N + 1
such that
• Given prices and government policies the decision rules solve the problem of the agents
and of the ﬁrms
• Initial distribution of new born agents F1(a,S) is given and time invariant. Additional
distributions Fh(a,S),h ≥ 2 are induced by decision rules and by transition functions
for exogenous states







• Government budget balances, i.e., equation (19) holds
3.5 Calibration
The spirit of the calibration exercise is to have a steady state equilibrium of the model
economy without the tax buyout to replicate some key cross-sectional statistics of a repre-
sentative sample of US households in 2006. In particular we focus on households with at
least one member aged between 25 and 60 and who report positive earnings (i.e., house-
holds who participate actively in the labor market) from the 2007 Current Population Survey
(CPS) for earnings and tax statistics and on a comparable group of households from the
2007 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) for wealth data.3 We decided to target earnings,
tax and wealth statistics and abstract from reported statistics on labor input (i.e., hours
worked) as we believe that reported hours worked are an imprecise measure of the true
eﬀort exerted by the households and hence not very informative on one key parameter for
our study, i.e., the Frisch elasticity of labor supply (for more on this point see Feldstein,
1995). Instead we rely on a series of recent empirical studies to identify a plausible range
of values for the Frisch elasticity and then, for each value of the labor elasticity, we set
3Both datasets refer to the calendar year 2006.
19the remaining parameters (i.e., initial distributions, variance of wage shocks, distribution
of discount factors) following related micro-studies or to match earnings and wealth data.
We now describe in detail our procedure.
Period length and life span. A period in our model is a year and since we focus on
households with the reference person between age 25 and 60 we set N = 36.
Utility function. Following many of the quantitative studies in the area (for example
Conesa et al. 2008) we use the following functional form for period utility
U(c,l) = log(c) − v
l1+γ
1 + γ
,v > 0,γ > 0
The crucial parameter for our purposes is γ, which maps one to one on the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply (which is equal to 1
γ). Recent quantitative work by Kimball and Shapiro
(2008) and by Erosa, Fuster and Kambourov (2009) who take into account variation in
the extensive margin, intra-household adjustment and possibly non linear wage schedule
suggests a value for γ of 1. Other econometric studies (see for example Blundell, Duncan
and Meghir, 1998) favor a value closer to 1/2 so our range for the Frisch elasticity is [0.5,1]
with our benchmark value being 0.75. We set the parameter v so that all households which
choose consumption exactly equal to their labor income work exactly 1/3 of their time.
Technology. Technology parameters are standard and we set capital share α = 1/3
and depreciation rate of capital κ = 0.1
Interest rates and wages. The interest rate in this economy is exogenously ﬁxed and
we set it to 1%. There is abundant empirical research that estimates statistical process for
log-wages using panel data in the US and in other countries (for a survey see Katz and Autor,
1999). Most studies model the log wage as a sum of four components: a permanent part (due
to ﬁxed characteristics such as ability, education and sex), a deterministic age dependent
factor (due to un-modelled accumulation of human capital), a very persistent process (close
to a random walk, capturing long run trends in wages due to permanent factors such as
career changes), a transitory process (close to i.i.d. capturing temporary shocks such as
unemployment). Our choice of the process for individual eﬃciency units of labor reﬂects
these studies and in table 1 we summarize the full set of parameters characterizing the
process.
20Table 1. Wage process
Component Distribution Dynamics Process Parameters
ε Uniform i.i.d εih σ2(εi) = 0.08
p Normal AR(1)
pih = 0.99pih−1 + ηh,
pi0 given
σ2(ηi) = 0.02,σ2(pi0) = 0.1
A Uniform Deterministic Aih = Ai for all h σ2(Ai) = 0.2
z Deterministic zih = χ1h − χ2h2 for all i χ1 = 0.02,χ2 = 0.0013
Note. h subscripts indicate age and i subscripts indicate households. In the computed version
of the model the processes for ε,p and A are approximated using 5 states Markov chains
Note that σ2(εi), and σ2(ηi) are taken from a recent study (Heathcote, Perri and Vi-
olante, 2010) which estimates persistent and temporary components for log wages in the US
over the period 1967-2002. The other parameters, such as the variance of the permanent
diﬀerences σ2(Ai), the variance of initial draw of the persistent shock σ2(pi0) and the ones
characterizing age/wage proﬁle (χ1 and χ2), are set so that earnings in our model match the
age proﬁle for mean and variance of household earnings (per adult equivalent) in the CPS
data (see ﬁgure 3 below, panels a and b).4 It is worth noting that the pattern of earnings
dispersion over the life cycle (panel b) in the data displays two sizeable increases, the ﬁrst
early in life and the second just before retirement. The pattern of earnings dispersion in
the model matches these two increases. The increase in dispersion early in life in the model
is captured by picking the dispersion of the initial draw of the persistent shocks below its
long run value so households age and the persistent shocks reach their long run distribution
earnings dispersion increases. The ﬁnal increase in dispersion instead is due to the fact
that, as retirement nears, persistent shocks become more like temporary shocks. Thus the
labor supply response to these shocks is more pronounced, increasing earnings dispersion.
Initial wealth distribution, discount factor and retirement length. A well
known problem of models like the one considered in this paper is their inability of generating
wealth dispersion comparable to the data. This shortcoming is important for our purposes
because our speciﬁcation of utility implies that wealth is an important determinant of labor
supply, so if our model fails to match the wealth distribution it will also fail to match the
distribution of labor eﬀort and the willingness of agents to take the contract. For this reason
we introduce two features to allow our model to match wealth dispersion in US data. The
4Adult equivalents are computed using the OECD equivalent scale.
21ﬁrst is that we start agents with a distribution of wealth that matches the coeﬃcient of
variation of the distribution of wealth of 25 year old households in the US SCF. Second we
divide households in two groups, as for example in Krusell and Smith (1998), one with high
discount factor and one with low discount factor and we choose the distribution of discount
factors so that the model matches the coeﬃcient of variation of wealth over the life cycle
(see ﬁgure 3, panel d).5 Finally we set the parameter φ = 0.04, capturing the incentive to
save for retirement so that our model matches the average wealth to earnings ratio for the
economy (see ﬁgure 3, panel c).
Government policies
Tax system A crucial element of our analysis is the current tax system, as this deter-
mines households’ outside option whenever they are pondering whether to take the contract
or not. Applied public ﬁnance literature (Gouveia and Strauss, 1994) has proposed the fol-
lowing ﬂexible functional form to capture variation of tax rates over the income distribution
T
Y
= τ0 − τ0(τ1Y τ2 + 1)
− 1
τ2 (20)
where Y is pretax income, T is the tax bill including federal, state and local income taxes
plus social security and medicare contribution, and τ0,τ1 and τ2 are parameters determining
the levels and the slope of tax rates. This function is ﬂexible enough to capture ﬂat,
proportional, and progressive taxes and the parameter τ0 has the natural interpretation
of the asymptotic marginal tax rate. We estimate the parameters of this function using
the sample of households from 2007 CPS data6 and the results are reported in ﬁgure 4
below. Notice how, with the exception of the very low income, the function ﬁts tax rates
in 20 quantiles very well. Our estimate of the asymptotic marginal tax rate τ0 is 32%, the
estimate for the parameter τ2, capturing the progressivity of the tax system, is 2.4 and the
(scale dependent) parameter τ1, capturing the overall ﬁscal pressure, is 11.9. In the CPS
data the ratio of total tax bill to total income is about 21% and using the estimated tax
function (20) in our model economy yields a comparable ratio.
Social security Retired agents receive social security payments TR(S). We specify
5In particular we set the discount factors of the 2 groups equal to 1.033 and 0.98 and set the size of the
ﬁrst group to be 1/4 of the size of the second.
6We use the same sample to compute earnings statistics to calibrate the wage process described above.
The CPS reports state and federal taxes plus FICA due by each household in the sample using a tax simulator
model.
22Figure 3: Earnings and wealth moments: data and model





































































































23Figure 4: Tax functions























2007 Average tax rate in quantile
Estimated using Gouveia Strauss
Post crisis tax rate
social security payments using a simpliﬁed version of the social security payment func-
tions used in Imrohoroglu and Kitao (2009), that captures the concavity of social security
payments as a function of lifetime income. In particular we assume that social security pay-
ments are a function of A, i.e., the permanent component of the wage and use the following





0.9¯ lωeA for A ≤ A20
0.8ω¯ leA20 + 0.1ω¯ leA for A20 ≤ A ≤ A60
0.8ω¯ leA20 + 0.1ω¯ leA60 A > A60
where A20 and A60 are the 20th and 60th percentile of the distribution of A and ¯ l is the
average labor eﬀort in the economy.
Debt and government consumption. In steady state we set government debt to 0
and so government consumption g is set residually from the budget constraint (19) as the
diﬀerence between tax revenues and social security transfers.
244 The experiment
In our baseline experiment we start from a steady state equilibrium with low total govern-
ment expenditures (including g, transfers and interests on debt) where no tax buyouts are
oﬀered. This is the economy we calibrated in the previous section using our sample of US
households in 2006. We then assume that, unexpectedly, public expenditures increase a
level which is 20% higher than in the initial steady state, capturing with this a structural
and permanent change in the economy, such as an aging population resulting in higher
total (but not per retired household) transfer expenditures or an increase in debt and in-
terest payments due to the ﬁnancial sector bailout.7 The path for government spending
is depicted in ﬁgure 5 panel (a). We then compute two possible equilibrium paths: one
under which the buyout is oﬀered and the other under which the buyout is not oﬀered.
We obviously need to make assumptions on how revenue shortfalls are ﬁnanced and what
type of buyout is oﬀered. In our benchmark experiment we assume that in the no-buyout
case taxes are increased so that the budget is balanced in the period in which the ﬁscal
spending increases, and then the tax policy is left unchanged. The increase in the tax policy
is the one depicted in ﬁgure 4, going from the policy represented by the dashed line to one
represented by the dashed-dotted line. In particular we increase the parameter governing
the asymptotic marginal tax rate, τ0 and leave the other parameters unchanged so that
additional expenditures are ﬁnanced leaving the progressivity structure unchanged, which
implies that high income households pay a higher fraction of those. In the buyout case we
use the same path for ﬁscal policy of the non buyout case, with the only diﬀerence being
the oﬀering of the buyout, starting from the date of the ﬁscal expansion. The particular
buyout we consider is a maximum 5% reduction in tax rate oﬀered to everybody at a price
of roughly 11.6% of average pretax income per adult equivalent per household (in our CPS
2006 sample mean pretax income per household per capita is about $39,000 so the cost of
the buyout would be about $4,500). This is the minimum price that guarantees that the
government budget is always positive after the introduction of the buyout.
Aggregate consequences: baseline case. The aggregate consequences are described
7In our set-up the composition of increased spending (higher total transfers, higher g or higher interest
payments) does not matter.






as a fraction of total income that is collected under the two regimes. Notice that under no
contract this measure of ﬁscal pressure is about 26% of income while with the buyout is
reduced to around 24.5% of income. Yet panel (c) shows that total government budget is
about the same in the two regimes. Since spending is the same in the two regimes, what
is making up for the loss of distortionary revenues in the buyout case? The answer is in
panel (d) which shows that a signiﬁcant fraction of the population (over 8%) is purchasing
the buyout, thus creating a source of non distortionary revenue that makes up for the
loss of distortionary revenue arising from the oﬀering of the contract. This feature, i.e.,
the transformation of part of government revenues from distortionary into lump sum, done
without making anybody worse oﬀ and in a revenue neutral fashion, is the essence of the tax
buyout contract. Panels (e) through (h) show that the reduction in distortion has actually
quantitative important eﬀects. Panel (f) shows that labor supply in the world with buyout
is about 1/3% higher than in the world without buyout, precisely because households who
elect to purchase the buyout choose to work harder. Notice that because households which
purchase the buyout and work harder are agents with high eﬃciency units (see the discussion
below), the buyout increases average labor productivity, which in turn results in a fall in
output (panel e) which is over 1% lower than the fall experienced in the world without the
buyout. Panels (g) and (h) ﬁnally show that as a result of the tax increase, households
suﬀer a negative wealth eﬀect which induces them to choose lower consumption and bring
less wealth into retirement. Under the buyout, due to the lower distortions, the wealth
eﬀect is less severe and both the reduction in consumption and in wealth are more muted.
Aggregate consequences: alternative scenarios. In this subsection we evaluate
how the aggregate impact of a tax buyout varies when we change some of the assumptions in
the baseline case analyzed above. In particular we evaluate the option of the government of
oﬀering smaller or larger buyouts and of using a diﬀerent pricing scheme. Also we assess the
importance of a key parameter: the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. For each experiment we
set the price of the buyout to the minimum level that guarantees non negative government
budget in every period. In table 2 we report ﬁve summary statistics for each experiment:
26Figure 5: Aggregate consequences of buyouts

























































































































































27the maximum buyout agents are allowed to sign, the total price of the max buyout (as
a percentage of mean income), the percentage of households who buy (in all experiments
here, as in the simple model of section 2, either a household does not buy or buys the
maximum possible amount), the percentage of government revenues coming from the sales
of the contract (hence non distortionary) and the gain in GDP relative to the situation in
which the contract is not oﬀered.8
Lines 2 and 3 show how increasing the maximum size of the buyouts leads to an increase
in price, i.e., larger buyouts are more expensive, even on a per-unit basis. As a consequence
there is a smaller number of buyers, but since those buyers buy a larger and more expensive
tax reduction, the resulting government revenues from the sale of the buyout increase. Since
the buyers have high wages and those are the ones who increase their labor supply even
a large buyout has a sizeable impact on GDP. Similarly a smaller buyout is cheaper, it
increases the number of buyers, but is less eﬀective in generating revenues and reducing
distortions.
Line 4 shows that oﬀering a buyout whose price is increasing in the age of the households
can attract more buyers and generate more revenues. Older households, because of the
deterministic component of wage that grows with age, beneﬁt more from the contract and
are more willing to pay a higher price.
Finally lines 5 and 6 show that changing the Frisch elasticity of labor supply has a limited
eﬀect on the outcomes of introducing the buyout. The reason for this result is that when
we change the Frisch elasticity we also recalibrate the variance of the wage shocks to match
the variance of earnings in the data. When, for example, we consider a higher value for the
Frisch elasticity, we increase the eﬀectiveness of the buyout as reduction in distortions are
more valuable. But at the same time a higher elasticity requires a lower variance of the wage
shocks, including the non permanent ones. The lower variance reduces the extent through
which agents adjust labor supply to take advantage of temporary changes in productivity,
and hence reduces the eﬀectiveness of the buyout. These two oﬀsetting eﬀects operate when
we change elasticity in both directions and explain the relative robustness of the eﬀects with
respect to changes in the Frisch elasticity.9
8These last 3 statistics are averaged over the ﬁrst 5 years in which the buyout is oﬀered.
9To verify this claim we experimented with changing the elasticity and not recalibrating the model. In
that case we found that changes in the elasticity have a substantially larger impact on the eﬀectiveness of a
buyout.
28Table 2. Alternative scenarios
Buyout size Price
(% of mean income)
Buyers Revenues GDP Gain
1.Baseline 5% 11.6% 8.2% 4% 0.95%
(a) Varying the size of the buyout
2.Large buyout 10% 33% 4% 5.6% 0.8%
3.Small buyout 2% 3.3% 14.5% 2% 0.6%
(b) Alternative pricing schemes
4.Age dependent 5% 5.5% + 0.25%h 10.1% 4.2% 1.1%
(c) Alternative Frisch Elasticity∗
5.Low (0.5) 5% 12.8% 6% 3.3% 0.55%
6.High (1.0) 5% 12.1% 8% 4% 0.9%
*In experiments 5 and 6 the variance of wage shocks is recalibrated so the variance
of earnings in each case matches the variance of earnings in the data
Micro Consequences. An advantage of explicitly considering a dynamic economy is
that we can identify households who have the strongest incentive to buy the contract today
but also those who will beneﬁt from its introduction as they might take the contract in the
future. One can interpret a tax buyout as the possibility for households to buy at a ﬁxed
price a percentage subsidy on labor income; obviously households who beneﬁt from it the
most are the ones who have (or expect to have) high labor income. This implies that, ceteris
paribus, high wage (and hence older) households, more patient (because they value more
the future chance of getting into a state of high labor income) households, and low wealth
households (because lower wealth induces higher labor supply) are more likely to purchase
the buyout and hence will beneﬁt more from its introduction. In ﬁgure 6 we quantify this
beneﬁt by computing the lifetime consumption equivalent that diﬀerent types of newborn
agents are willing to pay to go from an economy without a contract to an economy with
a contract. On the x axis the ﬁgure reports the value of permanent wage component A
(as a measure of wage shock) of a given household and on the y axis lifetime the gain
(in terms of lifetime consumption) from the permanent introduction of the contract in the
economy. The lines labeled “low wealth” refer to households with 0 wealth (which is the
majority of newborn households), while “high wealth” denotes a median wealth level. The
labels “patient” and “impatient” refer to households with high and low discount factors (see
29Figure 6: Benefits from the introduction of the contract












































section 3.5 above).10 As discussed before the gains are increasing in wages, decreasing in
wealth and increasing in the degree of patience. Perhaps the most interesting feature of the
ﬁgure is that although none of the households depicted by the lines in the ﬁgure is actually
purchasing the contract in the current period, most of them enjoy a non negligible beneﬁt
from its introduction, as they value the possibility of future use of the contract. This makes
the point that in a dynamic world the beneﬁts of the buyout, if evaluated over the long run,
spread well beyond the 10% of the population which elect to take the contract at a moment
in time.
5 Conclusions
A tax buy-out is a simple contract between the government and private agents which can
reduce distortions in the economy without adversely aﬀecting government ﬁnances. Our
work indicates that its eﬀects are quantitatively relevant even in the very basic form we
10All agents we considered in the ﬁgure have the median level of the temporary and of the persistent wage
shock.
30have analyzed. This suggests that a tax buyout scheme might actually be useful to reduce
distortions in a period in which, due to large ﬁscal deﬁcits, taxes are bounded to rise.
To implement the scheme in practice more analysis will be needed. There are two
main concerns that should be addressed. The ﬁrst is the presence of general equilibrium
eﬀects where the increase in labor supply of the buyers might reduce equilibrium wages, thus
hurting the low ability individuals who do not buy the contract. The second is the possibility
of a fat (Pareto) tail in the distribution of income/ability. This feature makes the reduction
in marginal taxes for high ability individuals, and hence the buyout, socially less desirable
(Diamond, 1998; Saez, 2001). A fat right tail of the ability distribution is also concerning
as it may imply non existence of a price that guarantees revenue neutrality for the simple
buyout considered in this paper. Future research could investigate the possibility of limited
buyouts, in which individuals’ gains from the tax reduction cannot exceed a multiple of
the price paid. These limited buyouts would be less eﬀective in reducing distortions, but
at the same time would limit government losses on high ability individuals, enhancing the
feasibility of the contract.
On the positive side there are many dimensions along which the contract can be extended
to further reduce distortions for a larger fraction of the population. First, as shown in a
simpliﬁed setting, non linear pricing schemes can extract resources from high ability in
favor of low ability individuals. Second, we have performed our quantitative analysis in
an informationally constrained setting, where the price of the contract is either ﬁxed or
dependent on age. Of course, in reality the government observes many additional individual
characteristics, such as education and past labor income, and could condition the price of
the contract on them. In this case, however, one would need to consider the dynamic
implications of the contract on individual behavior, as they might reintroduce some of the
distortions that the contract is supposed to eliminate. For example, conditioning the price
on past income will break the lump-sum feature of the tax buyout, as an individual takes
into account that labor income today aﬀects the price of the contract tomorrow. Third,
in the paper we have assumed the same elasticity of labor supply across individuals but
there is evidence of heterogeneity (Aaberge et al. 2002). Implementing the contract in
an environment with this feature might lead to self (benign) selection of high elasticity
individuals into the contract, allowing lower prices and higher acceptance. Finally, we have
excluded from the analysis capital taxation. It will be interesting to analyze simultaneously
31the reform of capital and income tax, considering to what extent the buyout can be applied
to capital taxation and what types of complementarities can arise between the two schemes.
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34A Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Deﬁne the budget constraint in terms of consumption and leisure:
(1 − τ)(1 − l(A,w,τ)) + c(A,w,τ) = w + 1 − τ
Let’s start from the case in which the government prices in such a way that the contract is
self-ﬁnancing at the pre-contract equilibrium labor supply:
D = δlA(0,0)
Then, the contract is a compensated price change. In fact, the “endowment” (that is, total
income ﬂow at leisure 0) is now:
w + (1 − τ + δ) − δlA(0,0)
which is exactly the expenditure we obtain for the old allocation at the new prices:
(1 − τ + δ)(1 − lA(0,0)) + cA(0,0) = w + (1 − τ + δ) − δlA(0,0)
where we have used cA(0,0) = −(1 − τ)(1 − lA(0,0)) + w + 1 − τ. Then, we only need to
assume that preferences over leisure and consumption satisfy the weak axiom of revealed
preferences to conclude that labor supply with the contract increases (see prop. 2.F.1 in
Mas-Colell et al. 1995). Moreover, given that by construction the old allocation is still in
the budget set, the agent is strictly better oﬀ.
Now we need to show that the argument carries through when we use our pricing
scheme. For given δ, deﬁne ∆l(D) ≡ l(δ,D)−lA(0,0), where D is the price of the contract
and l(δ,D) is labor supply with the contract priced D. Deﬁne the equation
D = δlA(0,0) − (τ − δ)∆l(D) ≡ g(D). (21)
We need to show that there exists a solution D∗ < δlA(0,0) at which ∆l(D∗) > 0. This
is our price. We have shown before that g(δlA(0,0)) < δlA(0,0), because at that value
35∆l(δlA(0,0)) > 0. Now, under the assumption that ∆l(D) is increasing (leisure is normal
good) and continuous, by decreasing D starting from δl0, the right-hand-side of equation
(21) increases, so that the equation must have a solution at a D∗ < δl0. At this price,
∆l > 0. Assume not: if ∆l = 0, then D = δl0, at which ∆l > 0, which leads to a
contradiction. The same reasoning applies for ∆l < 0: in that case, D > δl0 and the wealth
eﬀect implies that ∆l > 0.
Proof of Lemma 1: From the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to δ at a saddle point
δ∗ we have that:
D = AlA(δ∗,dδ∗). (22)
Multiply both sides by δ∗, substitute (22) into the agent’s budget constraint (9) and obtain:
cA(δ∗,dδ∗) = (1 − τ + δ∗)AlA(δ∗,dδ∗) + w − dδ∗
= (1 − τ)AlA(δ∗,dδ∗) + w.
(23)
This shows that (cA(δ∗,dδ∗),lA(δ∗,dδ∗) is a feasible allocation even in absence of the con-
tract. The fact that it is not chosen – the agent chooses instead to consume and work
cA(0,0) and lA(0,0), respectively – indicates that the utility at any saddle point is lower
than that when the contract is not taken. Hence, any saddle point must be a minimum.
Therefore there are only corner solutions to the agent’s problem.
Proof of Lemma 2: We want to show that there exists a per-unit price dA such that: i)
agent A is willing to enter the contract, and ii) the government is neither losing nor gaining
resources from the agent. Let dA be such that (8) holds – that is, the second condition is
met – when the agent purchases the maximum allowed amount of the contract ¯ δ:
dA¯ δ = τAlA(0,0) − (τ − ¯ δ)AlA(¯ δ,d¯ δ).
From agent A’s perspective, this is the same pricing as under perfect information. Therefore
Proposition 1 applies: at that price the agent is willing to purchase the contract. Note also
that at δ = ¯ δ the marginal utility of the agent is still increasing in δ:
AlA(¯ δ,d¯ δ) − rdA = A
τ
¯ δ
(lA(¯ δ,d¯ δ) − lA(0,0)),
and from Proposition (1) we have that lA(¯ δ,d¯ δ) − lA(0,0) > 0.
36Next, we want to show that there exists a per-unit price dA for which agent A is indiﬀer-
ent between taking and not taking the contract. Deﬁne ∆uA as the diﬀerence between the
utility from taking the contract (and therefore, from Lemma 1, purchasing the maximum
amount δ = ¯ δ) and not taking the contract (δ = 0):
∆uA = u(cA(¯ δ,d¯ δ),lA(¯ δ,d¯ δ)) − u(cA(0,0),lA(0,0)).
We are interested in the mapping between the per-unit price d and ∆uA. Proposition 1
implies that for d = dA the mapping is strictly positive. As long as cA(.) and lA(.) are
continuous in their arguments, the mapping is also continuous. Let us increase d to the
level d
u
A such that we have a saddle point at δ = ¯ δ:
d
u
A − AlA(¯ δ,d¯ δ) = 0. (24)
Since this is a saddle point, we can show that ∆uA is negative at d = d
u
A appealing to
Lemma 1: (cA(¯ δ,d¯ δ),lA(¯ δ,d¯ δ)) is a feasible allocation even in absence of the contract. The
fact that it is not chosen shows that ∆uA is negative at d = d
u
A. Therefore by continuity
there exists a dA ∈ (dA,d
u
A) such that ∆uA is zero and the agent is indiﬀerent. The
government’s net revenues from agent A, equal to
d¯ δ − ¯ δAlA(¯ δ,d¯ δ)
are strictly increasing in d as long as leisure is a normal good. Hence the government is
gaining resources from agent A for d > dA.
Proof of Lemma 3: We want to show that if agent with ability A(d) is indiﬀerent
between buying and not buying the contract under price d¯ δ, all agents with ability A ≥
A(d) will choose to purchase the contract. Call yA(¯ δ,d¯ δ) = AlA(¯ δ,d¯ δ) the pre-tax income
associated with an agent of ability A. Figure 7 plots the optimal choices with and without
contract, namely, (c1,y1) ≡ (cA(d)(¯ δ,d¯ δ),yA(d)(¯ δ,d¯ δ)) and (c0,y0) ≡ (CA(d)(0,0),YA(d)(0,0))
respectively. By deﬁnition, (c1,y1) and (c0,y0) lie on the same indiﬀerence curve for agent
A(d) (solid curve), which we denote by:
u(c,y,A(d)) = u(c0,y0,A(d))
37If utility is continuously diﬀerentiable and ¯ δ is strictly greater than zero, then the two
allocations (c1,y1) and (c0,y0) are apart from one another, since the tangency points are
1 − τ and 1 − τ + δ, respectively. Moreover, since 1 − τ < 1 − τ + δ and the indiﬀerence
curve is convex, we have that c0 < c1 and y0 < y1.
Let us consider a marginal increase in the ability level from A(d) to ˜ A = A(d)+ε. The
single crossing condition postulates that
−uY (.)
uC(.) is decreasing in ability. Graphically, that
means that the indiﬀerence curve for the agent with ability A(d) + ∂A is ﬂatter at both
(c1,y1) and (c0,y0) than the indiﬀerence curve for A(d) (dashed lines in Figure 7). That
means that the indiﬀerence point passing through the allocation with the contract (c1,y1)) is
associated with higher utility than the one passing through the allocation without contract,
(c0,y0). If this were not the case, that is, if the indiﬀerence curve associated with (c0,y0)
were to pass through (or above) (c1,y1)), then it would be crossing the solid indiﬀerence
curve again, which contradicts single crossing. Hence the higher ability agent will buy the
contract.
Formally, let (˜ c1, ˜ y1) and (˜ c0, ˜ y0) be the optimal allocations for an agent of ability ˜ A with
and without the contract, respectively. Let ˜ u1 and ˜ u0 denote u(˜ c1, ˜ y1, ˜ A) and u(˜ c0, ˜ y0, ˜ A),
respectively. Let
u(c,y, ˜ A) = ˜ u0
be the indiﬀerence curve going through (˜ c0, ˜ y0). By the single-crossing condition (Salani´ e
2003) the indiﬀerence curve for agent ˜ A going through (c0,y0) has a slope which is less than
(1 − τ). Hence the optimal allocation (˜ c0, ˜ y0) is to the right of (c0,y0), that is, ˜ c0 > c0 and
˜ y0 > y0. Therefore the indiﬀerence curve u(c,y, ˜ A) = ˜ u0 must be such that u(c0,y0, ˜ A) < ˜ u0.
Moreover, this indiﬀerence curve must cross the indiﬀerence curve for the A(d) ability
individual, u(c,y,A(d)) = u(c0,y0,A(d)), at some point (ˆ c0, ˆ y0) to the right of (c0,y0), that
is, such that ˆ c0 > c0 and ˆ y0 > y0. By the same argument, the optimal allocation (˜ c1, ˜ y1)
is to the right of (c1,y1), that is, ˜ c1 > c1 and ˜ y1 > y1. Therefore the indiﬀerence curve
u(c,y, ˜ A) = ˜ u1 must be such that u(c1,y1, ˜ A) < ˜ u1. Moreover, this indiﬀerence curve must
cross the indiﬀerence curve for the A(d) ability individual, u(c,y,A(d)) = u(c1,y1,A(d)),
at some point (ˆ c1, ˆ y1) to the right of (c1,y1), that is, such that ˆ c1 > c1 and ˆ y1 > y1. Note
that the allocations (ˆ c0, ˆ y0) and (ˆ c1, ˆ y1) are distinct, since for ε small enough we can make
them arbitrarily close to (c0,y0) and (c1,y1), respectively. Moreover ˆ c0 < ˆ c1 and ˆ y0 < ˆ y1.
38Hence, we have found two points, (ˆ c0, ˆ y0) and (ˆ c1, ˆ y1), at which the indiﬀerence curves
for the higher ability agent, u(c,y, ˜ A) = ˜ u0 and u(c,y, ˜ A) = ˜ u1 respectively, cross the
indiﬀerence curve for the indiﬀerent agent u(c,y,A(d)) = u(c0,y0,A(d)). It cannot therefore
be that ˜ u0 = ˜ u1, since that would imply that the same indiﬀerence curve for the higher
ability agent crosses the indiﬀerence curve for the lower ability agent twice, violating the
single crossing condition. If we had ˜ u0 > ˜ u1, then the indiﬀerence curve u(c,y, ˜ A) =
˜ u0 would lie above the indiﬀerence curve u(c,y, ˜ A) = ˜ u1. But this cannot be, since it
would imply that the indiﬀerence curve u(c,y, ˜ A) = ˜ u0 crosses the curve u(c,y,A(d)) =
u(c0,y0,A(d)) to the right of (ˆ c1, ˆ y1). This contradicts the fact that ˆ c0 < ˆ c1. Hence, there
exists an ε > 0 such that the agents with ability ˜ A = A(d) + ε strictly prefer to purchase
the contract. While the argument given here applies to abilities in the right neighborhood
of A(d) only, we can repeat it to show that for all A > A(d) agents will choose to purchase
the contract.
A.2 The algorithm used to compute the discretized set of contracts
The algorithm works as follows. Imagine a discretization {Ai}N
i=1 of the interval [A, ¯ A] with
A0 = A and AN = ¯ A. Fix the maximum amount ¯ δ that the government is allowed to oﬀer.
From the optimal taxation literature we know that in general the highest ability individual
AN should have the lowest marginal tax rate, hence it is natural that the maximum tax
reduction should be targeted toward agent N, hence δN = ¯ δ. Fix the price DN associated
with the maximum tax reduction, and assume that DN is such that agent N is willing
to buy the contract (from the analysis in Section 2 we know that if agent N faces a pre-
contract marginal tax rate of τ, for δN ≤ τ she will be willing to buy the contract for any
DN ≤ δANlAN(0) where lAN(0) is the pre-contract labor supply).
The problem of the government is to choose the remaining contracts {δi,Di}N−1
i=1 so that
households {Ai}N
i=1 will self-select into purchasing only one contract. We tackle the problem
in a pairwise fashion: Given the contract tailored for agent i + 1, {δi+1,Di+1}, we choose
{δi,Di} so that: (a) agent i + 1 is indiﬀerent between contract i + 1 and i, and (b) agent i
prefers contract i to i+1. We construct {δi,Di} as follows: We know that, since Ai+1 > Ai,
in order to have separation we need that δi+1 > δi (in this discussion we maintain the
assumption that pre-contract marginal tax rates are the same across agents). We therefore
39start with a candidate δi = δi+1 − xδ, with xδ a very small number. If Di = Di+1, agent
i will prefer contract i + 1. Hence we lower Di by multiples of xd – another very small
number – until agent i prefers contract i over contract i + 1. For Di < Di+1 agent i + 1
may also prefer contract i over contract i + 1, violating (a). We therefore further lower δi
to δi = δi+1 − 2xδ, and, if needed, lower Di to make it appealing to agent i. We repeat
the two steps until the gap between δi+1 −δi makes agent i+1 indiﬀerent between the two
contracts (condition a) while the diﬀerence Di+1 − Di makes condition (b) hold. Once we
have chosen the contract for agent i, we repeat the same steps for agent i − 1, and so on.
By construction the self-selection works pairwise: agent i prefers her contract to i+1 or
i−1. It turns out that it works for all (i,k): agent i prefers her contract to any other contract
k (we check this condition numerically). The intuition for this result is that indiﬀerence
curves for the agents in the consumption/income space are steeper for the less able agents
(see Stiglitz 1982). Therefore if agent i + 1 is indiﬀerent between her contract and the i
contract, while agent i is indiﬀerent between her contract and the i−1 contract, then agent
i + 1 will strictly prefer her contract to i − 1, and vice versa. In fact, in our numerical
example we ﬁnd that the disutility from taking contract k for agent i increases with the
distance |Ak − Ai|.
As we go down the ability ladder, at some point an additional constraint comes into
consideration: agent i must prefer contract i to not taking the contract at all. If this is not
the case, we stop: we have identiﬁed the highest ability individual not willing to take the
contract. All individuals with lower ability will also not buy it.
Finally, we provide details on the numerical results presented in section 2. The economy
is the same as the one described in section 2, except that we introduce insurable idiosyncratic
productivity to make it more comparable with the calibrated economy of section 3. The
utility function and its parameters are the same as the one used in section 3. We use a
log-normal distribution for both the permanent and the temporary component of abilities
with a variance of log earnings equal to 0.3 and about 1/3 of total variance due to the
temporary component of abilities. Finally, the initial tax rate is set to 40% and the real
interest rate r to 0.04. We also assume that for each agent wealth equals ﬁve times their
pre-contract income.
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